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THE SECOND ANGLO -ICEL ANDIC COD WAR
(1972–73)
Analysis of a Modern Sea Dispute and Implications for the South
China Sea
Jeremy Thompson

British foreign policy is full of occasions when we’ve withdrawn from
things. Normally we kill a lot of people first. There may be an example in
history where we have withdrawn, retreated, capitulated the way we did
over the fishing dispute, but I can’t think of one. That doesn’t mean we
were wrong to do it, it just means it was historically unique.
ROY HATTERSLEY, LORD HATTERSLEY, BRITISH MINISTER OF STATE,
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (1974–76)

Clearly the result of all the naval operations in Icelandic waters was that
the cod caught by the British . . . during 1972–3 were undoubtedly the
most expensive fish ever caught.

O

AMBASSADOR HANNES JÓNSSON
ICELANDIC AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION (1974–80)

cean politics is an obscure but important subset of international relations that
combines “a wide range of subject matter, from ocean boundary delimitation
and disputes to fishery conservation and management to seabed mineral resources exploitation and exploration.”1 The multidisciplinary, nuanced, and evolutionary nature of the field demands that scholars, businesspeople, diplomats,
and politicians who are drawn to ocean politics by choice or by circumstance
must understand the relationship among ocean-based economies; national and
international politics; and international norms, law, and legal theory. No other
phenomenon reveals the multidimensional asCaptain Jeremy Thompson, USN, is an explosive
ordnance disposal officer and naval strategist. He is pects of ocean politics better than international
a graduate of the Joint Forces Staff College and the
sea disputes, and there may be no better case study
Naval War College, as well as the Johns Hopkins
University School of Advanced International Stud- than the Anglo-Icelandic fishery disputes that beies. He currently serves as chief of staff for Navy Ex- gan in 1952 and finally were settled in 1976.2
peditionary Combat Command Pacific.
There were four Anglo-Icelandic sea disputes,
Naval War College Review, Spring 2022, Vol. 75, No. 2
each sparked by new, larger claims by Iceland to
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exclusive fishing rights extending from its coast. The first dispute (1952–56) began
when Iceland extended its claim from three to four nautical miles offshore, matching
Britain’s recognition of Norway’s claim to a four-mile zone.3 Britain responded with
diplomatic protests and sanctions against Icelandic fish imports from 1952 until
1956, and neither party resorted to the use of force in this first dispute. A new claim
extending twelve miles offshore sparked the second dispute (1958–61), and the third
dispute (1972–73) followed a claim extending out to fifty miles. The fourth dispute
(1975–76) followed Iceland’s final claim, to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) out
to two hundred miles offshore.4 The second, third, and fourth disputes involved
standoffs at sea and numerous violent (but nonlethal) interactions between the
Royal Navy—augmented by civilian “defense tugs”—and the Icelandic coast guard.
These are popularly known as the First, Second, and Third Cod Wars, respectively,
although they more accurately are considered to be militarized disputes.
This article seeks to add to the field of ocean politics and contribute to understanding modern sea disputes by analyzing the political and legal contexts,
balance of power, structural asymmetries, and strategies employed by the British
navy and Icelandic coast guard during the third Anglo-Icelandic sea dispute,
from September 1972 to November 1973, known as the Second Cod War. It illuminates how modern sea disputes, particularly those occurring subsequent to
the international law of the sea regime’s rapid evolution following the Second
World War, exist in the realm of competition for limited objectives, rather than
that of warfare. The events that transpired in 1972 and 1973 on the cold waters off
Iceland, in parliament and headquarters buildings, and in the pubs and ports of
fishing villages in Britain and Iceland provide insight into why all participants—
diplomats, politicians, fishermen, and sailors—should understand how the use
of force can risk escalating a dispute from the peacetime competitive realm into
undesirable open conflict, which jeopardizes the enduring legitimacy and recognition of their claims. Moreover, when a sea dispute escalates into conflict or
when external legal and political constraints are great, the dispute’s structure and
symmetry can be transformed, with—as Britain found—potentially deleterious
effects to the necessary social and political support for pursuing the competition.
Nonetheless, the Cod Wars demonstrate that sea-dispute competitors cannot
win merely by not losing; they must compete in the physical realm to establish,
maintain, or expand their claim de facto, and cannot rely on the de jure rules,
protections, or provision of access stipulated by international law. Ideally, competitors posture their enforcement and economic means to attain access and
build physical facts to support legal bases for their objective, essentially staking
their claims. But at a minimum they must apply persistent presence, and oftentimes they are compelled to militarize the dispute by employing physical but nondeadly force to compete for their objectives and, once achieved, to protect those
achievements through arbitration or open conflict if the competition escalates.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss2/9
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Insights from the Second Cod War can inform and help in analyzing the highstakes sea disputes unfolding in the Arctic Ocean and the East and South China
Seas. Britain’s and Iceland’s respective approaches to their dispute can illuminate
the strengths and pitfalls of competing methods among today’s great powers to
manipulate the economic and political costs to their rivals without diminishing
their own bargaining power and legitimacy or their ability to posture for moreopen confrontation if legal arbitration favors their competitors as they pursue
objectives in contemporary sea disputes.5
BRITAIN’S LONG-DISTANCE FISHING INDUSTRY
Although the sea disputes in question occurred in the last half of the twentieth
century, the undercurrent of conflict began to swell as seafaring technologies
shrank the vast space of ocean and enabled fishermen to compete for resources
far beyond their home waters. That far-seas competition accelerated substantially with the advent of the steam trawler in the late 1890s, leading to an explosion
of long-distance fishermen traveling from continental Europe and the British
Isles to distant fishing grounds such as Iceland. This provides salient context
for the subsequent dispute between Britain and Iceland, as it changed British
culinary habits and taste for certain fish and created new incentives that affected
Britain’s views on maritime territorial rights.
Britons began fishing in the waters adjacent to Iceland as early as the fifteenth
century, when boats from major fishing ports such as Barking, Gravesend, Harwich, Scarborough, Whitby, and especially Yarmouth conducted long, sporadic
summer journeys to the Icelandic fishing grounds to fill their hulls (see figure 1).6
The nature of long-distance fishing then was much different from today’s. In
the presteam era, the primary fishing method was with longlines—a laborious
process of luring and catching fish with baited hooks (see figures 2 and 3).7 To
preserve catches for the long journey home from distant fishing grounds, British
fishermen cured fish by smoking them over wood-shaving fires for up to twenty
days or by splitting them and packing them in barrels between layers of salt. British tastes adjusted to the expanded supply of dried and salted fish.8
In the 1880s, the steam-screw trawler augured a new era of long-distance fishing that achieved significantly greater catches. Trawling uses massive net systems
with a much higher rate of catch and far greater overall take than longline fishing
(see figures 4 and 5). Although trawling had existed for centuries, the origins of the
Second Cod War can be traced directly to the impact of combining trawl nets with
the power and endurance of steam-driven vessels that could manipulate the trawls
much more effectively while hunting schools of fish. This put the fish off Iceland
within reach of British fishermen, albeit only in the summer months. The first
British steam trawler recorded off Iceland was Aquarius out of Grimsby in 1891,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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followed by nine others fishing off Iceland’s southeast coast the next summer.9
By 1903, “between sixty and seventy
Grimsby trawlers were visiting Iceland
on a regular basis . . . and a further
Peterhead
eighty Hull trawlers.” The increased
Aberdeen
catch and speed of steam-driven, longDundee
distance fishing vessels made fresh fish
Leith
much more widely available in Britain’s
domestic market and led to a preference
for fresh fish over preserved, which led
North Shields
to an increased demand for fresh fish
Whitby
Scarborough
and trawlers to hunt them in the rich
Bridlington
Hull
fisheries on Iceland’s continental shelf.
Fleetwood
Grimsby
Liverpool
By the Second Cod War in 1972, Britain
took nearly half its total fish catch from
Yarmouth
Lowestoft
the waters around Iceland.10
As market demands made distant
Milford Haven
Barking
fishing grounds—particularly those
Ramsgate
Dover
surrounding Iceland—more imporHastings
tant to the British fishing industry, the
Newquay Plymouth Brixham
British government’s position toward
maritime sovereignty and rights grew
Source: Robinson, Trawling, p. 41.
Map 1. Trawling Ports of the British Isles, 1900-1950
more liberal, setting up international
political disputes in the twentieth century. In the late nineteenth century, before
this shift, the British government had considered encouraging its North Sea
neighbors to limit fishing rights in those grounds. This was intended to protect
the fisheries closest to Britain for the sake of conservation and sustainability,
since the North Sea, as a global common, was subject to overfishing. However, as
British fishing fleets became more reliant on fishing grounds closer to the shores
of other countries than they were to those around Britain, the government realized that stricter territorial limits on economic rights could be detrimental to its
emerging interests in those distant fisheries. The trawling trade’s position was
summarized well in 1908 by Charles Hellyer, a leading trawler owner from Hull:
“[I]t is of paramount importance that the three mile limit [of territorial seas
from a state’s coast] be maintained . . . because we have to approach other people’s shores to bring the fish to England.” This sentiment—an ominous harbinger
of the Cod Wars a half century later—was echoed by Britain’s secretary of state
for foreign affairs in 1952. “Our deep-sea fishing fleets take 90 percent of the
British catch. Any general scramble to increase the area of exclusive jurisdiction
FIGURE 1
TRAWLING PORTS OF THE BRITISH ISLES
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FIGURES 2 AND 3
LONGLINE FISHING TECHNIQUES

127

over the high seas would probably
lead to the exclusion of our deepsea trawlers from some of their
present fishing grounds.”11

ICELAND GROWS COLD TOWARD BRITISH FISHERS
Native Icelanders were reluctant,
if not antagonistic, hosts to the
foreign trawler fleets that came to
the island’s adjacent waters to hunt
cod and herring. Observers of Icelandic history typically explain in
one of two ways the aversion that
Icelanders had toward sharing the
bounty with foreigners.
The first explanation emphasizes the observation that
in 1944 Iceland emerged as an
independent country from more
than six hundred years as a semiautonomous territory of larger
Scandinavian states, unleashing
a deep-seated Nordic identity
that spurred nationalistic agenSource: “Longlining,” Australian Fisheries Management Authority, afma.gov.au/.
das for territorial independence
and international recognition. Britain’s ambassador to Iceland during the first
Anglo-Icelandic fishery dispute noted that “the Icelanders were governed by the
Danes, not harshly but negligently. Always there was a longing for independence,
a memory—a heightened and high-lighted memory—of the great days of the
past.” A telling anecdote was a response from Iceland’s prime minister Hermann
Jónasson to an inference by the British ambassador to Iceland that defying the
British government would invite Russian interference in Iceland’s affairs: “What
about the Germans? In 1938 they wanted airfields here. I was Prime Minister
then for the first time. I told them to go to hell. It will be the same again—Russians, yes, Americans, yes, British, yes—all the same. . . . WE WILL ALL GO
BACK TO EATING CODS’ HEADS BEFORE WE WILL SUBMIT TO FOREIGN THREATS!”12
The second explanation for Icelanders’ unwillingness to share the fisheries off
their coast is that they sincerely believed the fish stocks were declining owing to
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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FIGURE 4
TRAWLING TECHNIQUE

Source: S. R. W. Moore, “The Occupation of Trawl Fishing and the Medical Aid Available to the Grimsby Deep Sea Fisherman,” British Journal of Industrial
Medicine 26, no. 1 (1969), p. 8.

FIGURE 5
DIAGRAM OF TRAWL SYSTEM (NOTE THE TOWING “WARP”)

Source: Robinson, Trawling, p. 119.

overfishing—a “tragedy of the commons” scenario in which unregulated exploitation in the absence of property rights ultimately results in the destruction of
natural resources. Although it was indisputable that the fishing industry was a
major component of Iceland’s economy, the Icelandic government’s claim that the
fish stocks were dwindling was debated heavily. Much of the jockeying during the
Cod Wars involved innumerable scientific briefs by both the British and Icelandic
governments to convince the international community that the fisheries were or
were not threatened by overfishing.13 Sir Andrew Gilchrist, a British ambassador
to Iceland, summed up his government’s sentiment on the scientific debates:
“[Statistics] can always be disproved or discredited by some new form of calculation, based (for example) on a change in scientific opinion as to whether twoyear-old cod are the best breeders, or whether they are more fertile at three years.
And national interest or bias could not be eliminated.”14 British prime minister
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss2/9
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Sir Edward Heath answered the question of the Icelandic fisheries’ sustainability
more pithily: “Don’t make me laugh, there was no problem of conservation there,
and all the fishermen knew it.”15
Iceland’s political objectives leading up to the Cod Wars merged the burgeoning national identity that motivated Icelanders to expunge foreign influences
with concern over long-term economic interests, particularly the sustainability of
“its” fisheries. Neither purpose was more important to the Icelandic people than
the other—a point that is noteworthy when considering the multidimensional
incentives of contenders in contemporary sea disputes. Lúðvík Jósepsson, the
Icelandic fisheries minister who presented a convincing case on fish sustainability and the legal merit of Iceland’s claims to the international community over
the course of the fishing rights dispute, summed up Iceland’s objective this way:
“We are very few, we Icelanders, and we have fought for a long time for our independence in Iceland, and we have learned that the basis for our independence is
economic independence. Therefore, we all realize that to prevent the fish stocks
around Iceland from overfishing that means . . . everything for us in Iceland regarding our independence.”16
By the 1950s, the government of Iceland was seeking opportunities to limit
the British fishing fleet and assert its independence, and it found opportunity
not solely in diplomacy or force (means-based approaches) but in the evolutionary nature of international law and legal theory (a theoretical and law-based approach). The Cod Wars were “lawfare” at its best.
MARITIME LEGAL THEORY AND SEA DISPUTES
In addition to the historical context of the Anglo-Icelandic fishing dispute, it is
necessary to consider the rapid evolution of maritime law and legal theory in the
lead-up to the Second Cod War. In international law, “legal theory seems to follow law as law seems to follow fact.”17 In the field of ocean politics, world events
and actions tend to shape national and international maritime law, which in turn
shapes maritime legal theory. Over millennia, two competing maritime legal
theories emerged whose normative and legal precedence remained unresolved at
the advent of the Cod Wars.
The Ancient Theories: Mare Liberum and Mare Clausum
The older theory is mare liberum (free sea). It originated in Roman law and practice whereby “the sea was considered communis omnium naturali juri, namely,
by nature common to all mankind and consequently not to be possessed like
land.” The second-century Roman jurist Marcianus made one of the earliest pronouncements on the legal status of the sea: “that the sea and the fish in it were
open or common to all men.”18 Mare liberum remained paramount for centuries
and still applies to the large swaths of ocean considered high seas under current
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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international law—those seas beyond two hundred nautical miles from any
claimant’s shore.19
The other theory is mare clausum (closed sea). This theory began to form in
the Middle Ages when kings and princes of coastal states started to claim sovereignty over waters adjacent to their land territories.20 By the latter half of the
nineteenth century, the colonial powers of Europe, as well as the United States,
had adopted a three-mile territorial limit where the freedom-of-the-sea doctrine
stopped and national sovereignty over coastal waters began.21
Modern Maritime Law Leading Up to the Second Cod War
Following the Second World War, some countries began to take unilateral or
collective action in their national laws on the basis of closed-sea theory. Two
legal precedents motivated the government of Iceland to extend sovereign rights
over its surrounding waters: the 1945 Truman Proclamations and the Santiago
Declaration of 1952.
Reacting to the critical strategic role that independent oil reserves had played
during the Second World War, the U.S. government initiated the first significant
break from freedom-of-the-seas doctrine by issuing the so-called Truman Proclamations in 1945. The first claimed jurisdiction over the natural resources of the
seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf surrounding U.S. territory—an area
that extends tens of nautical miles off its West Coast and over a hundred nautical
miles from the East and Gulf Coasts.22 A second proclamation, released the same
day (28 September), claimed the right to establish fishery-conservation zones in
the high seas contiguous to the coast of the United States—without specifying a
distance from landward baselines, other than to associate them with areas that
had been or would be developed or maintained as fisheries.23 This second proclamation is an early antecedent of what developed into the two-hundred-mile EEZ
regime in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It
also shares similarities with contemporary claims such as China’s unilateral claim
in the South China Sea (SCS) known as the “nine-dash line,” in that China broke
from accepted precedent and did so with overly broad protocols and ill-defined
boundaries and limitations of rights. The difference between the two, however, is that the Truman protocols preceded and informed the development of
UNCLOS, while China’s first assertion and explanation of its nine-dash-line
claim, as presented in a note verbale to the United Nations in 2009, is inconsistent
with the convention’s limitations on a state’s jurisdiction over its territorial sea
and continental shelf.24
The other major contribution to delimiting the high seas during the postwar
period was the Latin American zone extension. In 1952, the governments of
Chile, Ecuador, and Peru ratified the Santiago Declaration, which proclaimed

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss2/9
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that each signatory possessed “exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction over the sea
along [its] coasts . . . to a minimum distance of 200 nautical miles” and that “this
maritime zone shall also encompass exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction over
the seabed and the subsoil.” The declaration went on to specify that innocent and
inoffensive passage of foreign vessels would be allowed and that the signatories
would establish norms to regulate hunting, fishing, and resource exploitation in
the zone.25
THE FIRST COD WAR
Naturally, there cannot have been a Second Cod War without a first one. While
many countries still supported the three-mile territorial sea that was standard in
the early 1950s, Iceland saw opportunity in the U.S. and Latin American precedents toward extended territorial seas and the broader trend in international
law favoring the principle of mare clausum to secure its economic independence
through expanded maritime claims.26 Risking war with Britain, the Icelandic
government unilaterally extended Iceland’s fishery limits, first out to four miles,
and then again out to twelve miles from its coast.
Iceland’s government first extended its fisheries rights in the 1950s with two
legal maneuvers. First, it submitted a notice to Britain in 1949 terminating a 1901
agreement between Denmark and Britain that established a three-mile territorial
sea around Iceland. After the required two-year notice for abrogating the agreement, it expired in 1951 without a noteworthy British response.27 Second, the
Icelandic government seized on the precedent of an Anglo-Norwegian fisheries
case decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague in Norway’s favor in 1951. In that case, Britain objected to Norway establishing straight
baselines across its heavily indented coastline from which to extend its territorial
maritime boundary.28 However, the British did not object to Norway’s contemporaneous claim of a four-mile territorial sea limit, even though common practice
was still three miles. After studying the court’s judgment, Iceland deemed that it
also was entitled to a four-mile fishery limit (it did not claim an additional mile
of territoriality, as Norway had) and straight territorial baselines across its coastal
bays. Iceland enacted national regulations, to take effect 15 May 1952, prohibiting
“[a]ll trawling . . . off the Icelandic coasts inside a line which is drawn four nautical miles from the outermost point of the coasts, islands and rocks and across the
opening of bays.”29
Britain’s effective recognition of Norway’s four-mile territorial sea left it with
little legal room to object to Iceland’s claim. Nonetheless, Britain responded during this first Anglo-Icelandic fishery dispute with diplomatic protests and sanctions—banning all Icelandic fish imports from 1952 until 1956—but it did not
employ any force.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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In 1956, Hermann Jónasson, of Iceland’s populist Progressive Party, became
prime minister at the head of a coalition government with an eye toward extending fishing rights even further. The Progressive Party had significant backing from
fish-processing and -export business interests and prioritized achieving economic
stability by expanding Iceland’s exclusive fishery access.30 Having formed a coalition primarily on a platform to protect and extend Iceland’s fisheries, Jónasson and
the members of his government leveraged the emerging international law trends to
issue another national regulation extending Iceland’s fishery and territorial limits.
In 1958, the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I)
took place in Geneva. The conference ended that April without consensus among
the eighty-six participating states on a territorial sea limit or exclusive fishing
rights. But as the Canadian observers to the conference noted, “more than eighty
nations voted for a twelve-mile fishing jurisdiction in one or other of the forms in
which it was advanced in the various proposals put forward” at the conference.31
Later that year, Iceland leveraged this trend to justify a unilateral claim to a twelvemile fishing limit. The British government—being committed out of its own
economic interest to the “freedom of all nations to fish on the high seas”—saw the
move as far more contentious than Iceland’s previous four-mile fishery extension,
considering it a grab for sovereign rights that did not (yet) exist.32
The first of three “cod wars” ensued, pitting the Royal Navy (as it provided protection to British trawlers) against the Icelandic coast guard (as it sought to expel British
trawlers from the newly claimed exclusive fishing zone). It was a war only in a sensationalist sense; nevertheless, the two North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
allies engaged in a low-intensity conflict. The skirmishes involved aggressive maneuvering, intentional collisions between British trawlers and Icelandic coast guard vessels, law-enforcement operations (such as attempted boardings), warning shots, and
presence patrols.33 Many of the same tactics would be repeated in the Second Cod War.
In the end, Britain’s objective in this first militarized fishing dispute was “to
bring Iceland to an agreement so that British trawlers could continue to fish up
to the old limits for as long as possible . . . until new limits were internationally
agreed.”34 After three years of low-intensity conflict, this first cod war concluded
with the Anglo-Icelandic agreement of 1961. The United Kingdom agreed to
drop its objection to Iceland’s twelve-mile fishing zone, and for a period of three
years the Icelandic government would not object to British trawlers fishing
within the outer six miles of that zone.35 Ultimately, the agreement provided ten
years of relative peace between Britain and Iceland.
THE SECOND COD WAR GETS UNDER WAY
The 1961 Anglo-Icelandic agreement was signed for Iceland by a conservative
government coalition of the Independence Party and Social Democrats that
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss2/9
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succeeded the Progressive Party in 1959 and governed throughout the decade between the First and Second Cod Wars. However, the peace was not to last. Several
maritime law trends rapidly developed in the years following the agreement that
opened the door for further fishery extensions. In March 1964, the governments
of thirteen states, including Britain, signed the European Fisheries Convention.36
The convention established a twelve-mile fishery limit for all the signatories, and
therefore could be considered a de facto nullification of the 1961 Anglo-Icelandic
agreement, since Britain now had its own twelve-mile limit.
Then, in 1968, the United Nations established a Seabed Committee to seek a
“clear, precise, and internationally accepted definition of the area of the sea-bed
and ocean floor which lies beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”37 New technologies that enabled extracting oil, natural gas, and minerals at greater water
depths compelled most states to agree that sovereign rights should be extended
to include exclusive extraction rights over the continental shelves surrounding their landmasses. This was a significant political and legal development for
Iceland, whose continental shelf extends out more or less uniformly about fifty
miles offshore.
Many coastal states used this trend to legitimize large coastal zones of exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction similar to what the Latin American states had
claimed with the zone extensions of 1952. The Montevideo Declaration was
signed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama,
Peru, and Uruguay in 1970, claiming the right of coastal states to avail themselves
of and explore, exploit, and conserve natural resources in the sea, seabed, and
subsoil out to a distance of two hundred miles from the baselines of their claimed
territorial seas.38 They also claimed the right to establish limits of sovereignty and
jurisdiction and to establish regulatory measures, without prejudice to freedom
of navigation, in this zone. Similar ideas were supported by the Scientific Council of Africa, which recommended to the Organization of African Unity that its
members adopt a twelve-mile territorial limit and a two-hundred-mile EEZ.39
Iceland was involved heavily in these diplomatic and legal moves, often
sending small groups of technocrats well versed in ocean politics, fishery protection, and maritime law to relevant international conferences. Although the
Independence Party and the Social Democrats “were very much interested”
in extending Iceland’s exclusive maritime claims while in power from 1959 to
1971 and engaged in protracted support campaigns for similarly minded states
such as the Montevideo Declaration signatories, it was clear to the Icelandic
people that the governing coalition “[was] not going to extend the fisheries
limit of Iceland until after favourable conditions for a further extension had
been created by the international community through further development of
the Law of the Sea.”40
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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By 1971, Iceland’s political climate had shifted and the fishery zone limits
established by the 1961 diplomatic note exchange between Iceland and Britain
were no longer acceptable to the Icelandic people. This likely was owing to
the increase in Britain’s catch from Icelandic waters, from 134,250 long tons in
1966 to 168,650 long tons in 1971.41 In 1971 the Progressive Party returned to
power in a coalition with the People’s Alliance and the Liberal Left Party on a
platform pledge to extend Iceland’s fishery claim without waiting for the third
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), scheduled for 1973 in Santiago, Chile.42 The political mood also was influenced by a communist base that
appealed to the “growing spirit of self-regarding nationalism among the Icelanders . . . [and] also hoped that by involving the British in controversy . . . [the communists] would likewise create trouble for those allies of the British, the Americans, whose expulsion from Keflavik [air base] was their declared objective.”43
In early July 1971, the new coalition government again placed a bet that Iceland
was aligned with a trend toward delimiting the seas even further and declared a
fifty-mile exclusive fishing limit to take effect on 1 September 1972 (see figure
6). It argued that the extension “would not affect the freedom of the sea, because
Iceland was not seeking to extend her territorial waters, only the fishery limits.”44
Iceland’s legal approach to delimiting resource jurisdictions was novel on the international stage, based on the principle of jurisdiction over the seabed resources
of a state’s continental shelf. Iceland asserted that since demersal fish species such
as cod relied on the seabed for subsistence and habitat, jurisdiction over fisheries
in the waters above the seabed naturally should be extended to the coastal state.45
This later proved to be a tenuous argument in international arbitration.
BRITISH NEGOTIATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
A few days after Iceland announced this new claim, the British undersecretary
for foreign and commonwealth affairs, Anthony Royle, expressed to the House
of Commons that the extension was contrary to international law and should be
referred to the Law of the Sea Conference to be held in 1973. Royle elaborated
that “[t]he proposed 50-mile limit would include virtually all the fishing grounds
in the Icelandic area, and the exclusion of our vessels from them would deprive
us of between one-fifth and one-quarter of all British landings of such species as
cod, haddock, and plaice. The effect on our fishing industry as a whole and on
supplies and prices would be serious, but for the distant water section of the fleet
it would be calamitous, as between 40 percent and 60 percent of its catch comes
from grounds which would be lost.”46 British cabinet papers during this period
reveal that the foreign secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, was pessimistic that
the ICJ would restrain the Icelandic government from extending the country’s
fisheries limits and was concerned that “[w]e should then have little alternative
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss2/9
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FIGURE 6
THE FIFTY-MILE EXTENSION
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to establishing a scheme of naval protection for our fishing vessels, which would
inevitably lead to a series of acrimonious incidents.” The minister of agriculture,
fisheries, and food, the Honorable James Prior, echoed this sentiment, expressing concern that a unilateral Icelandic extension—regardless of an ICJ ruling in
favor of Britain—would erode Britain’s position at the upcoming Law of the Sea
Conference in 1973.47
Behind Prior’s concerns was a broader worry: that the fisheries dispute could
have serious Cold War security implications. If Britain provided naval protection
to its fishing fleet, relations between Iceland and Britain might so deteriorate that
it could provoke the government of Iceland to denounce or, worse, renounce the
agreement permitting NATO forces use of the air station at Keflavík as a base for
maritime surveillance.48 Keflavík was a key hub for tracking Soviet submarines
entering the North Atlantic and a critical link in NATO’s ability to exercise sea
control over the strategic Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom (or GIUK) gap
during the height of the Cold War. When Iceland announced the unilateral fiftymile extension, it knew that the risk of NATO’s losing the base would be a major
consideration for Britain, and one that also likely would mute key international
support for Britain’s challenge, especially from the United States.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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To mitigate these concerns without acquiescing to the devastation of Britain’s
long-distance trawling fleet, the British government engaged with Iceland in a
yearlong negotiation before the fifty-mile extension went into effect. It offered to
cede some of its annual catch to appease the Icelandic government’s purported
concern over conservation. This would minimize one of Iceland’s principal
anticipated arguments at the next Law of the Sea Conference and thereby reduce Iceland’s leverage in future ICJ proceedings. While at one point Icelandic
ministers indicated that they would be satisfied with a 25 percent reduction in
Britain’s overall take from 1971 levels (to 156,000 tons, by some calculations),
sources differ on whether the British refused this offer or the Icelandic government retracted it.49
Still, the British government decided to seek an interim judgment from the
ICJ. The court, perhaps surprisingly, decided by fourteen votes to one in Britain’s
favor. It enjoined Iceland not to enforce the fifty-mile fishery limit, instructed
Britain to restrict its annual catch to 170,000 tons, and urged both sides not to
take steps that might aggravate the dispute.50 The ICJ ruling effectively upheld the
status quo and reinforced British access to fisheries up to the twelve-mile zone
and permitted it roughly the same catch as Britain’s trawlers had taken in 1971.51
Responding from what appeared to be a position of legal weakness, the government of Iceland declared that it did not accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction in the case,
in that the court “overstepped its authority by intending to bind a sovereign state
[Iceland] to an agreement which that state claimed to have terminated [the 1961
Anglo-Icelandic exchange of notes],” as an Icelandic diplomat later wrote.52 After
this, diplomatic relations between Iceland and Britain were frozen and the stage
was set for the Second Cod War.
A MARITIME DAVID AND GOLIATH
With a significant contingent of countries still supporting a universal twelve-mile
limit on a state’s exclusive coastal fishing rights, a vastly superior navy, and a ruling by the ICJ in its corner, Britain sought “to ensure that the catch limit ordered
by the International Court [was] complied with by British vessels . . . , taking only
such measures to counter Icelandic interference as [were] essential to enable British vessels to catch up to the authorised limit.” Such an objective would appear
to have been easily achievable.53 However, other strategic imbalances lent Iceland
key advantages in the contest.
Asymmetric Attitudes
Andrew Mack’s seminal etiology on asymmetric limited conflict argues that when
a greater, democratic power is engaged with a lesser power in a prolonged conflict
over limited objectives, there is significant potential to generate widespread social
and political opposition within the greater power’s society, effectively nullifying
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss2/9
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its political ability to wage such wars. He explains that “[t]he causes of dissent lie
beyond the control of the political elite; they lie in the structure of the conflict
itself—in the type of war being pursued and in the asymmetries which form its
distinctive character.” Mack makes a supporting point: that the opponent with
lesser means for waging war often coalesces around its people’s social and psychological bonds found in the common hostility toward the external aggressor,
specifically when that aggressor’s object lies within the lesser power’s indigenous
or inherited territory.54 Keeping in mind that the Second Cod War was one of
four sea disputes in a two-decade competition over fishing rights between Britain
and Iceland, understanding the strategic asymmetry between the two countries
helps explain Britain’s ultimate capitulation.
For most Icelanders, the fight over fishing rights was much more existential
than it was for the British. The former embraced a nationalism born out of their
Nordic roots and seven hundred years of quasi-colonial rule. Regardless of the
cause, the nationalistic fervor with which Icelanders tied their livelihoods to the
fisheries was a powerful motivator for their coastguardsmen and politicians,
demonstrated by the multiple political parties that came to power on promises
to extend Iceland’s fishery limits. Over a prolonged period both preceding and
following the Second Cod War, Iceland’s government, its oceanographic and legal
technocrats, and a majority of the Icelandic people themselves embraced a conditio sine qua non narrative with respect to the fisheries—that is to say, without
them Iceland could not subsist, and thereby would not exist as a nation. Although
the Icelandic government’s political object was limited to enlarging the extent of
the adjacent waters and seabed that it controlled (and perhaps later to limiting
NATO influence and basing), its motivation to achieve it was very high.
In contrast with Iceland’s economic dependence on its adjacent fishing
grounds, Britain’s take from long-distance fisheries—which also included those
in Norway, Greenland, the Barents Sea, and the Faeroe Islands—comprised just
1 percent of its gross national product.55 Britons as a whole were therefore much
less enthusiastic about enforcing their government’s maximalist position on
freedom of the seas than the Icelanders were about maximizing their exclusive
rights to the waters off their coast. Although the cost of a plate of fish and chips
in pubs and households in England would rise if the annual long-distance fishing
take from Icelandic waters was lost, “no one was keen on providing protection for
trawlers again. Memories of the first cod war were still strong and it was believed
that naval protection would only make the Icelanders more difficult and render
the possibility of successful negotiations even more remote.”56
On the other hand, elite consciousness of Britain’s long history of dominion over
the seas—a hangover from its empire’s broad naval control and access to the world’s
maritime routes and resources—may help explain the government’s reluctance
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to acquiesce to Iceland’s claims. A confidential joint memorandum from 22 July
1952 to Britain’s cabinet—signed by the secretary of state for the coordination of
transport, fuel, and power, by the First Lord of the Admiralty, and by the minister
of transport on the matter of territorial waters—urged that “the attitude of Her Majesty’s Government on this subject should reflect the confidence of a world power
whose policy looks to far horizons. We suggest it would be difficult to defend legislation which subordinated our wide naval, maritime, aviation, and fisheries affairs
. . . [and we] propose that at present the United Kingdom should . . . strengthen its
influence in attempting to secure internationally the narrowest possible interpretation of the new Hague Court principles and the shortest possible baselines.”57
It is possible that this cognitive bias toward seeing themselves as stewards of a
global sea power informed some British politicians and naval commanders when
the dispute matured from negotiation to heated interactions among fishermen,
the Icelandic coast guard, and the Royal Navy in the fall of 1972. But if British
leaders initially were impelled by a spirit of maritime supremacy, their decisions
later in the Second Cod War were grounded more on legal principle and resource
access. Regardless, Britain’s object was less central to its core national interests
than Iceland’s object was to its subsistence and survival. Furthermore, the two
island nations’ separation by the sea and the absence of any threat by Iceland
to its home territory left Britain much less motivated to deny Iceland’s fishery
extension than Iceland was to achieve it.58 The asymmetry between Iceland’s
more visceral attachment to the fishing grounds off its coast contrasted with
Britain’s mixed attitudes about the importance of its limited object—precisely
the dynamic that Mack had in mind in his thesis regarding asymmetric conflict.
Political Elements
In the lead-up to the Royal Navy’s provision of protection to Britain’s distant trawler fleet, some naval commanders were reluctant to engage in a second fishery conflict with Iceland.59 In contrast, the British fishing industry saw any extension of
Iceland’s fishery limits as a threat to its members’ livelihood and took bold actions
politically and on the water to influence the dispute’s outcome. Led by the British
Trawler Federation, those in the fishing industry pressured their representatives
in Parliament to provide naval protection to their trawlers and challenge Iceland’s
government more vigorously.60 The comparative pervasiveness of Iceland’s fishing
industry throughout Icelandic politics and daily life, however, gave the industry
far greater influence over events than its British counterpart could muster.
In each of its four fishery disputes with Britain, Iceland used the NATO alliance and the U.S. naval air base at Keflavík as leverage against Britain’s objections.
Although the government never directly threatened to abrogate the basing agreement, worrisome official rhetoric was in no short supply. Remarks by Progressive Party general secretary Steingrímur Hermannsson are representative of the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss2/9
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implied threats communicated to NATO and Britain: “Although I recognised that
we should not mix too much together our NATO membership and our fisheries
limit, I find it extremely hard to tolerate that we Icelanders sit in co-operation
with Britain in that organisation at the same time as they are inflicting such aggression on us in Icelandic waters.”61
Unsurprisingly—and no doubt as the Icelandic government had hoped—the
United States reacted to veiled threats against its basing rights at Keflavík by putting its own veiled pressure on the British government. U.S. officials reminded
their British counterparts that the NATO alliance and Keflavík had great strategic
importance; one internal cabinet report relates that “the United States Secretary
of State, Dr. Kissinger, had expressed . . . his anxiety about the future of the
American base at Keflavik, although no suggestion had been made to [the British government] that [it] should change [its] stance in the fishing dispute.” The
British government also feared that Iceland’s socialist and communist elements
were exploiting the dispute to put pressure on their government to terminate the
basing agreement. Concern over this issue also was felt at NATO headquarters,
where a strategy review emphasized the importance of the base to the defense of
the Atlantic area.62
New Developments in Maritime Law and Legal Theory
Despite some momentum in favor of mare clausum and delimiting approaches to
maritime law, this progressive school of thought was not accepted universally at
the start of the Second Cod War. Thirteen European countries had signed onto
the European Fisheries Convention of 1964, which delimited fishery rights at
twelve miles. In the lead-up to UNCLOS III in 1973, only a handful of countries
formally had issued national regulations or reached multinational agreements for
territorial limits or fishing rights beyond twelve miles (see table 1). At the outset
of the Second Cod War—especially in light of the ICJ interim ruling in favor of
Britain in August 1972—the Icelandic government was making an enormous bet
that it could continue to influence like-minded governments to adopt expanded
exclusive fishing rights for coastal states.
The ICJ’s ruling in favor of Britain wrested some momentum away from Iceland’s efforts to build international consensus for greater resource-management
rights. But Iceland retained a key advantage in the competition to shift ocean
politics: its skilled technocrats and advocacy experts in fisheries management, international law, and maritime security. Icelandic officials and technocrats rotated
frequently among government, industry, and academia—Ólafur Jóhannesson,
prime minister during the Second Cod War, was also a law professor who taught,
inter alia, international law at the University of Iceland—building relevant skills
and expertise. In any forum where law of the sea issues were discussed—no matter
how obscure—Icelanders advocated relentlessly for expanding the rights of coastal
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TABLE 1
COUNTRIES CLAIMING A TWELVE-MILE OR LARGER TERRITORIAL SEA OR EXCLUSIVE
FISHING ZONE BY 1964
Country

Territorial Sea

Exclusive
Fishing Zone

Year of
Enactment

—

1963

1. Algeria

12 miles

2. Belgium

—

3. Bulgaria

12 miles

4. Canada

—

12 miles

1964

5. Chile

—

200 miles

1947

6. Colombia

—

12 miles

1923

7. Cyprus
8. Faeroe Islands

12 miles

12 miles
—

—

1964
1951

1964

—

12 miles

9. Greenland

—

12 miles

10. El Salvador

200 miles

—

1950

12 miles

—

1953

11. Ethiopia

1963
1950

12. Gabon

12 miles

—

1963

13. Ghana

12 miles

—

1963

14. West Germany
15. Guatemala
16. Guinea
17. Indonesia

—
12 miles

12 miles
—

1964
1934

130 miles

—

1964

12 miles

—

1957

18. Iran

12 miles

—

1959

19. Iraq

12 miles

—

1958

20. Ireland

—

12 miles

1964

21. Italy

—

12 miles

1964

22. Korea

—

20–200 miles

23. Libya

12 miles

—

24. Madagascar

12 miles

25. Netherlands

—

12 miles
12 miles

26. Norway

—

27. Romania

12 miles

28. Saudi Arabia

12 miles

29. South Africa

—

—

—
—
12 miles

1952–54
1954
1963
1964
1961
1951
1958
1963

30. Sudan

12 miles

—

1960

31. Syria

12 miles

—

1964

32. Togo

12 miles

33. Tunisia
34. Turkey

—

—

12 miles

—

12 miles

1964
1962
1964

35. Soviet Union

12 miles

—

1909

36. United Arab Republic (Egypt)

12 miles

—

1958

37. United Kingdom
38. Venezuela

—
12 miles

12 miles
—

1964
1956

Source: Jónsson, Friends in Conflict, p. 112.
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states. (For example, in November 1971 Hannes Jónsson, Iceland’s secretary for
press and information, and Steingrímur Hermannsson—who at the time was the
director of Iceland’s National Research Council, and went on to become minister
of fisheries—were observers at a far-flung law of the sea conference held by the
Scientific Council of Africa in Nigeria.)63 The disparity in effectiveness between
Icelandic ocean-policy advocates and their British counterparts not only informs
lessons from the Anglo-Icelandic disputes but throws the importance of global
norm building in current sea disputes into sharp relief.
Iceland’s ocean politics experts largely resided in the powerful Fisheries Association of Iceland, a nonpartisan organization charged with administrative, technical,
and research work for which it received large government grants.64 Often, depending on whether the political party that held power in the Althing (Iceland’s legislature) supported assertive fisheries protection or expanding fishing rights (e.g., the
Progressive Party during the Second Cod War), these same technocrats worked as
officials in the Ministry of Fisheries. They attended law of the sea conferences in
Colombia, Nigeria, India, and Japan, where they helped to shape the progressive
school of thought for delimiting the sea.65 These technocrats may owe their popularity with the Icelandic people and preeminence in the story of the Cod Wars to
the fact that ultimately they played a significant part in winning the diplomatic and
legal “war” with Britain while another nonlethal battle played out on the sea.
Sea Power
Sea disputes nearly all directly or indirectly involve resource rights, alongside
other drivers such as maritime access, which the British considered to be “the
greatest possible freedom of movement for shipping in peace and the widest freedom for the exercise of belligerent rights in war.”66 Even if a dispute were based
exclusively on legal principle, prior agreements, or norms—which rarely, if ever,
has occurred—ocean resources in superjacent waters (such as fish) and subsoil
(such as oil and gas) naturally require the contending states to grapple with the
involvement of civilian and commercial actors such as fishery unions, fishing
companies, and their boats. In the Second Cod War, the British government was
able to coordinate its naval forces (primarily frigates, auxiliary ships, and Nimrod
maritime patrol aircraft; see figure 7) with a small contingent of contracted ocean
tugs (so-called defense tugs) and the British trawlers themselves (see figure 8).
Iceland deployed its coast guard’s six offshore patrol vessels and a handful of
helicopters against Britain’s trawlers, but still was wildly outclassed by the weight
of British sea power. Discounting those trawlers but including their protective
flotilla, Britain had a 3 : 1 advantage in the number of vessels, a 6 : 1 advantage in
overall tonnage, and a 14 : 1 edge in personnel over Iceland (see tables 2 and 3).67
Firepower, tonnage, and personnel all were greatly in Britain’s favor, but the
most important factor relevant to the opposed forces was speed. Although the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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FIGURE 7

The frigate Lincoln (F 99) in action with Icelandic coast guard vessel Ægir on 17 July 1973.
Source: Jónsson, Friends in Conflict, p. 141.

FIGURE 8

The British trawler Robert Hewett.
Source: Jón Páll Asgeirsson, as published in Welch, The Royal Navy in the Cod Wars, p. 111.
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TABLE 2
BRITISH FLEET PROTECTING BRITISH TRAWLERS INSIDE THE FIFTY-MILE FISHERY LIMIT,
1972–73, AS RECORDED BY THE ICELANDIC COAST GUARD
Gross
Tons

Horsepower

Speed
(knots)

No.
of Crew

Ashanti F-117

2,700

20,000

28

253

1

Cleopatra F-28

2,860

30,000

30

263

1

Jaguar F-37

2,520

14,400

24

235

Jupiter F-60

2,860

30,000

30

263

Lincoln F-99

2,170

14,400

24

237

Plymouth F-126

2,800

30,000

30

235

1

Scylla F-71

2,860

30,000

30

263

1

Helicopters

I. FRIGATES

[Total]

18,770

1

1,749

II. TUGBOATS (estimated)
Englishman

574

Irishman

451

15
131/2

15

18

15

Lloydsman

2,041

Statesman

1,167

15

[Total]

4,233

60

III. AUXILIARY SHIPS
Miranda

1,462

Othello

1,113

2,350

982

2,000

Ranger Briseis
[Total]

1,000

3,557

111/2

15
15

15

15
45

Grand total: 14 ships, 26,560 gross tons, 1,854 crewmembers
Source: Jónsson, Friends in Conflict, p. 216.

British frigates were the fastest platforms on the water (capable of twenty-four
to thirty knots), the Icelandic coast guard vessels (twenty knots, nominally; see
figure 9) were faster than both Britain’s civilian defense tugs (perhaps ten knots)
and the British trawlers; the latter were rendered even slower and more vulnerable anytime they were towing their trawl nets.68
Another key element of the sea power balance was seamanship skill. All the
ships plying the waters around Iceland were crewed by professional sailors. The
crews of the Icelandic coast guard vessels and the seventy or so British trawlers
that fished regularly around Iceland were intimately knowledgeable about the
local waters, weather, and fish havens when the Second Cod War began on 1 September 1972. On the other hand, the Royal Navy and the five contracted British
defense tugs were unfamiliar with Icelandic waters, and it took time for them to
orient themselves to the environment and to hone relevant noncombat skills in
skirmishes with the Icelandic coast guard. As in the First Cod War, which had
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022
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TABLE 3
VESSELS USED BY THE ICELANDIC GOVERNMENT TO COUNTER BRITISH FLEETS, 1972–73
Gross Tons
I.

II.

Horsepower

No. of Crew

SHIPS (COAST GUARD)
Ægir

927

2 × 4,300

25

Óðinn

882

2 × 2,850

25

Thór

693

2 × 1,570

25

Árvakur

381

1,000

14

Albert

201

665

12

WHALE HUNTERS ON
TEMPORARY LEASE
CONVERTED TO
COAST GUARD VESSELS
Hvalur 9 (Hvaltýr)

611

1,900

19

Hvalur 8

481

1,800

19

[Total]

4,176

139

III. AIRCRAFT
Fokker Friendship F27-200

TF-SÝR

Sikorsky HH-52A

TF-GNÁ

Bell 47J-3B

TF-HUG

Bell 47J-3B

TF-MUN

Source: Jónsson, Friends in Conflict, p. 217.

FIGURE 9

The Icelandic coast guard vessel Árvakur.
Source: Jón Páll Asgeirsson, as published in Welch, The Royal Navy in the Cod Wars, p. 110.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss2/9

22

THOMPSON

Thompson: The Second Anglo-Icelandic Cod War (1972–73)—Analysis of a Modern

145

ended in 1961, the British ships were assigned on a rotational basis, but this time
they were organized under the operational control of Flag Officer Scotland and
Northern Ireland (FOSNI), headquartered at Pitreavie, just north of Edinburgh;
the Fishery Protection Squadron that contended with Iceland in the First Cod War
had been reorganized in 1967 to provide fishery protection exclusively off the British coast. FOSNI organized its forces into task groups, each typically consisting
of two to four frigates, one auxiliary support ship, and one to three defense tugs,
and led by the senior embarked officer as officer in tactical command (OTC).69
Only one task group was deployed to Iceland at any time, and often ships were
cobbled together into assigned groups as little as seven days before deploying.70
The Icelandic coast guard took merciless advantage of this rotational arrangement
of task groups by identifying new captains or ships and “testing the new kid on
the block.”71
Finally, the asymmetry of the respective transit distances and the isolation of
the conflict space had a substantial effect on the level of force the contenders were
willing to use. If British ships or trawlers were damaged, they had to sail more
than 1,700 miles back to their home ports in England, while the Icelandic vessels
merely had to sprint a few miles back home (see figure 10).
FIGURE 10
DISTANCE TO FISHING GROUNDS (IN NAUTICAL MILES)
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Source: Moore, “The Occupation of Trawl Fishing,” fig. 1.
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STRATEGY AND TACTICS
The strategic balance between Iceland and Britain had much to do with their
respective commitment to their objectives. For Iceland to achieve its political
objectives—removing foreign influence and expanding the limits of its fisheries—it needed to apprehend, deter, or frustrate the trawlers operating within
its claimed fifty-mile limit (i.e., to make it as costly as possible for them to fish
there). With inferior sea power and no allies willing to supply forces in an isolated fishery dispute between NATO partners, Iceland had little choice but to
adopt a strategy to frustrate the British trawlers while its technocrats continued
to shape a consensus for the 1973 UNCLOS III in favor of its preferred mare
clausum principles. The ultimately successful Icelanders therefore adopted a
dual strategy of raising the political and economic costs to Britain (a meansbased approach) while envisioning an endgame predicated on altering dramatically the long-held international consensus on the concept of freedom of the
seas (a legal theory–based approach).
The British government was intent on promoting its view that the status quo
in maritime law—based on the concept of freedom of the seas—was correct
in principle and that it was committed to ensuring that Iceland’s intransigence
would not shape the attitudes or official positions of the delegations preparing for
UNCLOS III. Enforcing the ICJ ruling limiting Britain to an annual trawling
catch of 170,000 tons was incidental to promoting the territorial status quo, but
relevant as a lesser included objective. It is important to note that Britain’s political aim was not to assert that British trawlers had historic rights to Iceland’s
fisheries but to promote a freedom-of-the-seas regime—that is, not that British
vessels possessed particular rights, but that Iceland did not have standing to exclude any nation’s vessels from those fisheries. One former British naval officer
noted, “Her Majesty’s Government’s aim, as laid down in the OpOrder [operations order] for Operation DEWEY, was to maintain the legal rights of U.K. fishing
vessels on the high seas between 12 and 50 miles off Iceland.”72 However, Britain’s
yearlong attempt to negotiate sea rights ahead of the Second Cod War shows that
it was reluctant to engage in another conflict with Iceland, and perhaps that it
feared blame should Iceland leave NATO or expel the U.S. military from Keflavík.
The result was an incremental military strategy of increasing protective measures
for British trawlers gradually, constrained by strict rules of engagement to mitigate undesired escalation.
For the first eight months of the conflict, the British trawlers were without
naval protection, even though a handful of RN frigates lurked just outside the
fifty-mile limit, ready to assist. The trawlers attempted to deceive and confuse the
Icelandic coast guard by blacking out identification markings on their hulls and
superstructures and using false names in radio communications.73 In response,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss2/9
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Icelandic coast guard captains spoofed the British by recording and retransmitting trawler and RN communications to mask their own true locations.74 Trawlers
also were directed to work in pairs by the British Trawler Federation, an association of trawling company owners. A nonfishing trawler would station itself astern
of the fishing trawler and, when challenged by the Icelandic coast guard, would
attempt to fend it off by herding it away from the active trawler or by ramming
it. Although this tactic produced some positive effects for the trawlers, it also
reduced their take by half at least, since two vessels operating together deployed
only one trawl net at a time.75 Despite this success in initial skirmishes, no British
trawler was ready for the secret weapon the Icelandic coast guard introduced on
5 September 1972: the warp cutter.
Iceland Escalates with Warp Cutting
The British trawler fleet possessed two critical capabilities, without which there
would be no dispute to begin with: its range, and the massive trawl nets that could
catch fish at sufficient scale to make long-distance fishing expeditions profitable.
Iceland went directly for Britain’s jugular by attacking those nets. Between the
First and Second Cod Wars, Iceland’s coast guard developed a crude but effective
technology dubbed the trawl-wire cutter, better known as the warp cutter (warp
being the name for the trawl net’s tow cables). Adapted from minesweeping
equipment, the warp cutter was modified to cut steel cables using road-grading
blades welded to a steel frame. Icelandic coast guard vessels towed the cutter at
a distance and then crossed astern of a trawler whose trawl was deployed. Trawl
nets put immense strain on their warps, and when the cutters hit the cables they
“snapped like violin strings.”76 This tactic proved incredibly effective at frustrating the trawlers, denying them their catch and their profits. By the end of the
Second Cod War, Britain claimed
that eighty-two trawlers had their
FIGURE 11
gear cut; Iceland claimed the figure
was sixty-nine.77
Every time a trawl was cut it
required the affected trawler either
to return to port early to fit a new
trawl rig or, when feasible, to take
at least eighteen hours to repair
its gear and refit a new net at sea.
The search for a defense against
Iceland’s warp cutters began almost immediately. Some British
trawlers streamed ropes and wires
Iceland’s secret weapon: the warp cutter.
behind them to foul the screws of
Source: Jónsson, Friends in Conflict, p. 188.
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approaching coast guard vessels, but the tactic proved ineffective; presumably
the Icelandic vessels had propeller guards installed. In early 1973, the Royal Navy
tested a trawl system that could be diverted away from warp cutters, but the rig
proved too unstable. Britain’s principal impediment to designing a solution was
that it did not know what the warp cutters looked like, and the secrecy around
them gave Iceland’s coast guard an advantage against British countermeasures.
Toward the end of the Third Cod War, in 1976, the British satisfactorily tested an
explosive-charged “anti-warp-cutter cutter,” a design once again based on minecountermeasure equipment, but by the time it was fielded the Cod Wars were
nearly finished.78
The British government’s more immediate response to the havoc wreaked on
the trawling fleet by Iceland’s warp cutters was to contract large, unarmed civilian
tugs to defend the trawlers while RN frigates continued to monitor from outside
the fifty-mile zone. The tugs were chartered by Britain’s Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food (MAFF) and then transferred to the British register to avoid
potential political complications stemming from complex ownership rights. (For
example, the first tug to be placed in service was Statesman, in January 1973;
previously, it had been American owned, Liberian registered, British crewed, and
on long-term charter to the United Towing Company of Hull.) The tugs were captained by either a fisheries officer or a retired naval officer and given instructions
to support and assist British trawlers to counter Icelandic harassment while abiding by the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.79 However,
accounts differ between British and Icelandic sources on whether the tugs stuck
to those constraints or were either tacitly or secretly encouraged by the MAFF to
use more-violent tactics in the early months of their employment, such as ramming Icelandic coast guard vessels.80 Regardless, the official constraints initially
placed on the tugs’ rules of engagement (ROE) were loosened on 19 May 1973
to match the Royal Navy’s rules.81 The tugs had around a five-knot speed disadvantage in relation to the Icelandic coast guard vessels. To compensate, the tugs
would interpose themselves between the Icelandic coast guard vessels and their
quarry to frustrate their attempts to cut a trawler’s warps. Another Admiraltyapproved tactic had two or three trawlers fishing in echelon with a defense tug
stationed on the quarter of the rearmost trawler, but trawler skippers disliked this
tactic since it halved fishing efficiency.82
By May 1973, the trawler captains had had enough. The skipper of Northern Sky
sent a combined message to the trawler federation: “From all the British Trawlers.
It is now impossible to fish off Iceland due to continuous [Icelandic coast guard]
action. If naval protection is not forthcoming . . . it is the unanimous decision of all
trawlers to leave Icelandic waters.”83 On 17 May, the entire trawling fleet operating
in Icelandic waters gave up and departed across the fifty-mile limit.
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The Royal Navy Moves In
Caving to pressure from the British Trawler Federation and intent on upholding
its freedom-of-the-seas doctrine, the British government directed Commanderin-Chief Fleet and FOSNI to commence Operation DEWEY. FOSNI issued the
execute order to HMS Plymouth, HMS Cleopatra, RFA Wave Chief, and—in a
telling insight into the military-civilian component of sea disputes—the civilian
tugs Englishman, Irishman, and Statesman (all now under naval command); together, they escorted around thirty trawlers back inside Iceland’s fifty-mile limit,
meanwhile playing the patriotic British tune “Land of Hope and Glory” over
bridge-to-bridge radio.84 It was just two days after the same trawlers had left. The
unified front presented by the vessels of the British task group was demonstrative
of the shared interests, coordination, and unified control among the military, civil
government, and industry stakeholders that often is necessary to compete in sea
disputes effectively.
The British task groups led by FOSNI were directed to abide by detailed ROE.
Their purpose was to “attempt to frustrate harassment, allowing the use of force
up to certain levels. These included placing armed parties onboard trawlers to
prevent arrest [and] physically obstructing ICGVs [Icelandic coast guard vessels]
attempting to get to a trawler,” as well as the “use of searchlights, jamming of radar and radio, buzzing by helicopters, and counter-boarding of arrested trawlers[;
the] use of gunfire was only permitted in self-defence.” The ROE specified that
additional authorization could be granted for use of gunfire under the principle
of “clear warning and slow escalation to the minimum force necessary to disable
[an Icelandic] gunboat’s weapons.” Control of this last measure was held by the
Admiralty in Whitehall, but could be requested by FOSNI, the OTC, or an individual commanding officer.85
Eventually, the violence of the skirmishes increased. Incidents of British defense tugs ramming Icelandic coast guard vessels and inflicting damage significant enough to force them back to port were reported, with protests lodged by
the Icelandic government. Iceland recorded three ramming events by the British
between October 1972 and April 1973, and eleven between the months of June
and October 1973.86 Meanwhile, Icelandic coast guard vessels damaged British
trawlers, tugs, and warships alike. They began using both live and blank warning
shots more frequently in attempts to scare off British trawlers or halt them ahead
of boarding them.
In the lead-up to Britain’s naval protection campaign, Iceland’s ambition to
seize trawlers and arrest their crews was already a tall order against stubborn
trawler skippers, noncompliant crews, and boats rigged with nets and other
obstructions.87 When British frigates began arriving on scene, such arrests effectively became impossible.
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Two egregious incidents had immediate deleterious effects on the political
face of the conflict. First, the trawler Everton was shelled by the ICGV Ægir when
it refused to stop for boarding on 25 May 1973. Per Welch, “The two skippers
were in clear VHF communication. . . . When Everton refused to stop, Ægir fired
blanks and then 57 mm solid shot across the bow. This was followed by solid
shot from very close range, into Everton’s bow above the waterline. A crewman
[from Everton] was allowed forward to inspect the damage. . . . [O]ver the next
two hours, interspersed with orders to stop, Ægir fired seven shots into Everton,
the most dangerous of which caused a 4-in x 10-in hole below the waterline and
started to flood the lower hold.”88 The boarding did not happen, and the Icelandic
coast guard called off Ægir when Everton regained station with its protection task
group. Both the British and Icelandic governments submitted formal complaints
to the United Nations Security Council over the incident. The NATO secretary
general subsequently paid visits to both countries and told Prime Minister Heath
that “Britain was paying much too much attention to fishing and that it didn’t
matter,” who replied, “It did matter, a great deal.”89
The other serious incident was precipitated when the British trawler Lord St.
Vincent was caught by Ægir fishing within twelve miles of Iceland’s coast, prompting Ægir to give pursuit and attempt an arrest. HMS Sirius and HMS Plymouth
closed both vessels, resulting in a standoff while the British and Icelandic governments considered their options. Initially, the British Ministry of Defence (MOD)
gave instructions not to interfere with the arrest, as the incident occurred within
the twelve-mile Icelandic fishing zone that the British recognized, and disapproved a request by the OTC to place his frigates between the trawler and Ægir,
and to return fire in self-defense should Ægir disregard warnings and fire on Lord
St. Vincent. Eventually, the MOD approved this use of defensive gunfire, while
Britain’s ambassador to Iceland proposed that financial reparations would be paid
and the trawler’s skipper disciplined. The Icelandic prime minister rejected this
offer and demanded the trawler put in to an Icelandic port for arrest, which escalated the situation significantly. Ultimately, Iceland called off Ægir’s pursuit when
the coast guard assessed that an unopposed arrest was not possible, and the standoff ended.90 The incident had rattled the governments sufficiently that both had
involved themselves intimately in tactical control of their portions of the event,
serving as a clear signal that the line between strategic competition and conflict
was thinning. Overall, the political fallout accrued to Iceland’s advantage, with the
dominant media theme being “Britain uses frigates to prevent a lawful arrest.”91
DIPLOMACY AND DENOUEMENT
Following the escalation of force and growing number of collisions, Iceland
made several diplomatic and policy moves to frustrate Britain’s campaign and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss2/9
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hasten a resolution. Iceland’s foreign ministry informed the British government
on 7 September 1973 that Icelandic authorities only would accept sick or injured
persons from the fishing or naval fleets if they were brought ashore by boat. Any
British trawler coming into an Icelandic port for aid that authorities had listed
as a “poacher” subsequently would be interned on the spot. Iceland also forbade
communication by Icelandic air traffic control to British Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft operating in support of FOSNI, nominally placing responsibility for
any aerial accident squarely on the shoulders of the British government. Most
importantly, the government of Iceland submitted a formal threat to break off
diplomatic relations with Britain, close the British embassy in Reykjavík, and
expel British diplomats.92
Following these diplomatic maneuvers, plus another significant collision event
between HMS Lincoln and ICGV Ægir that was captured on video and broadcast around the world, Prime Minister Heath proposed a modus vivendi to his
Icelandic counterpart to reduce Britain’s catch leading up to the 1973 UNCLOS
III—“something between 130,000 and 150,000 tons was envisaged.”93 The Icelandic government, perhaps perceiving this direct communication from Heath as
sign of a break in the British government’s mettle, and therefore an opportunity,
quickly passed another resolution to officially break off diplomatic relations by
3 October 1973 if British warships and defense tugs did not remove themselves
beyond the fifty-mile limit. In response, the British government acquiesced, on
the condition that an Icelandic delegation travel to London for negotiations. The
FOSNI task group moved outside the fifty-mile limit and the subsequent negotiations took six weeks.
The key terms of the settlement ending the Second Cod War were as follows:
1. None of the freezer and factory trawlers (the largest boats) were allowed
within the fifty-mile limit.
2. Rotating conservation areas were designated, and some areas were closed
entirely to British trawlers (see figure 12 below).
3. The annual British catch was not to exceed 130,000 tons.
4. A list would be generated naming each trawler, and if Iceland’s Ministry of
Justice found any trawler in violation that vessel would be crossed off the
list, and no other trawler could be added in its place—thereby engaging
the interest of the British Trawler Federation in reinforcing the settlement
terms.94
The settlement was “universally welcomed in Britain,” since the trawlers
were able to continue fishing in Icelandic waters, even though the total annual
catch was reduced to 130,000 tons from the much higher ICJ limit of 170,000
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FIGURE 12
ICELAND–GREAT BRITAIN AGREEMENT ON FISHING RIGHTS, 1973
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Source: Bruce Mitchell, “Politics, Fish, and International Resource Management: The British–Icelandic Cod War,” Geographical Review 66, no. 2 (April
1976), p. 130, adapted from “Iceland–United Kingdom: Agreement concerning Fishing Rights,” International Legal Materials 12, no. 6 (November 1973),
p. 1318.

tons, or even Iceland’s supposed offer of 156,000 tons at the beginning of the
conflict.95
The reality, however, was that both sides knew the agreement was temporary.
UNCLOS III began in July 1973, and it was clear that a majority of countries
now supported the idea of an EEZ that provided coastal states sovereign rights
of resource management out to two hundred miles from their coastlines.96 While
the Royal Navy and Icelandic coast guard duked it out in the cold North Atlantic
waters, Icelandic technocrats succeeded in building an international consensus
around support for a large delimited resource zone. On 15 October 1975, the
Icelandic government again extended its fishery limits (from fifty to two hundred
miles offshore), precipitating a third, even more violent cod war that ended with
Iceland’s complete victory and the barring of all British trawlers from fishing
within two hundred miles of Iceland’s coasts. Ultimately, Britain adopted its own
two-hundred-mile EEZ and reshaped its fishing industry in favor of coastal fishing over long-distance fishing. By the late 1970s, the British long-distance fishing
industry effectively had ceased to exist.97
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Over four disputes across twenty-four years, the government of Iceland triumphed in a militarized dispute of attrition, “hoping that constant pressure,
intermittent warp-cutting, trawler indiscipline, Royal Navy frustration, and
international pressure would force the British Government to back down.”98 The
British government spent an incredible amount of money in this venture abroad
over territorial rights—£86 million in 1976 currency ($860 million in 2021 U.S.
dollars) for the Second and Third Cod Wars.99 Could Britain have done anything
to counter Iceland’s attrition strategy without risking a change in objectives or a
declaration of war by Iceland against its NATO ally? Anthony Crosland, Britain’s
foreign secretary at the conclusion of the Third Cod War, did not think so: “What
were the alternatives? There was in fact only one. That was to continue to pursue
the Cod War, with the certainty of dangerous escalation, with international and
especially NATO opinion moving sharply against us . . . with our moral position
steadily eroding as nation after nation accepted the principle of 200 miles.”100
That was an unacceptable choice.
But perhaps there was an alternative that Crosland and his colleagues did
not consider: a permanent carve out for British fishermen within Iceland’s
fisheries on the basis of historical rights. Britain’s policy proceeded from mare
liberum principles, but, as Crosland noted, international law and legal theory
were trending toward delimiting what previously had been considered the
high seas, and therefore a global common free for exploitation quite close to
the sovereign land of coastal states. Rather than attempting to maintain the
status quo regarding maritime boundaries every time they were expanded,
Britain might have succeeded in its objective to secure fishing rights if it had
de-emphasized the importance of Iceland’s zone extensions while emphasizing a historic right for British fishermen to operate in Icelandic waters on the
basis of their having done so for nearly a century already. International law
recognizes two types of historic maritime rights: exclusive rights, which bestow
complete sovereignty (e.g., historic waters and historic bays); and nonexclusive
rights, which bestow usage but not sovereignty (e.g., historic fishing rights in
shared seas).101 Simultaneous with Britain’s legal claim to its fishermen’s right
to operate between twelve and fifty miles from Iceland’s coast, the Royal Navy
could have imposed proportional, reciprocal costs on Icelandic fishermen—
whenever a British trawler’s warps were cut by Iceland’s coast guard vessels, a
British warship then would cut an Icelandic trawler’s warps, because the British
had as much of a historical right to fish there as the Icelanders. As it happened,
Icelandic fishermen went through the Cod Wars with little, if any, interference
from the British squadrons. Perhaps such a policy and strategy match could
have raised the costs of Iceland’s expanding claims sufficiently to force the
Icelandic government to concede Britain a permanent annual fish catch. And
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while the cause of mare liberum probably was lost in any case, more-forceful
British intervention might have helped win broader international support to
privilege historical fishing rights more liberally over sovereign rights in the use
and demarcation of the seas.102
Perhaps the greatest risk to placing costs on Iceland’s fish take and jeopardizing its subsistence would have been to the U.S. base at Keflavík. It seems certain
that Iceland would have used this diplomatic lever if the British had begun to
cut Icelandic trawl warps. It is possible Iceland could have been dissuaded from
such drastic measures if the British cut only one Icelandic net for each of their
own nets cut, in a calculated and open form of competitive reciprocity. Such an
approach would have been similar to the terms Iceland wrote into the settlement
of the Second Cod War, which removed one British trawler from the authorized
list for each violation of the settlement’s terms.
THE SECOND COD WAR RECONSIDERED
The nature of modern sea disputes may be substantially similar to that of limited
wars fought over access, resources, or territorial objectives. What the Cod Wars
leave for contemporary ocean policy practitioners and naval strategists is the pattern of constraints on rivals in a sea dispute—the historical, theoretical, and legal
influences on the dispute and the risks to objectives from escalating the dispute
into open conflict if the rival parties choose to disregard those constraints. Economic linkages and a growing trend toward global governance weigh heavily on
the minds of government leaders as they attempt to raise political and economic
costs for their adversaries and competitors without jeopardizing their own moral
position or threatening alliances. This is because every state in a modern sea
dispute desires the permanence bestowed by legal legitimacy—as long as it is in
their favor—and, in today’s rule-based international system, that legitimacy is
unobtainable through violent, deadly force escalating to open war.
Britain lost the Second Cod War in part because of its principled adherence
to the legal status quo ante and its precise interpretation of the 1971 ICJ interim
ruling in its favor during a period when ocean politics was progressing rapidly toward delimiting the seas. The balance of power was heavily in Britain’s favor, but
the balance of legitimacy, as a long-term trend, asymmetrically favored Iceland.103
The temporal legitimacy granted to the British by the ICJ ruling was not enough
to stymie the broader global trend toward mare clausum principles, which allowed Iceland the freedom to employ combinations of “lawfare,” “alliancefare,”
and “tradefare” (so to speak) to impose unacceptable economic costs on Britain’s
long-distance trawling industry while constraining the country politically with
the potential costs of fracturing part of the NATO alliance and the threat of losing access to Keflavík’s air base, with all the strategic consequences that implied
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at the height of the Cold War. These structural asymmetries are why the British
government capitulated in the Second Cod War and ultimately lost the dispute
outright a few years later. The asymmetries of this sea dispute seem to confirm
Mack’s thesis noted earlier: that the structural asymmetries are beyond the control of the political elites and have deleterious effects on a big power’s ability to
wage war for limited objectives.
However, where the Cod Wars depart from Mack’s thesis is that the asymmetries did not appear to have an impact on British domestic politics or social
attitudes to the extent that they influenced the British government toward either
continuation or capitulation. Certainly, there were relatively small pockets of
influence within the British Trawler Federation that pressured the government
to compete, but by and large it appears that the prime minister and cabinet made
decisions in a rational and principled fashion, including remaining sensitive to
Britain’s reputation within NATO and on the international stage. So it follows that
British and Icelandic information campaigns across the disputes merit future research and attention to determine whether Iceland’s media efforts had any impact
on the British Parliament or cabinet, if not on the general public or trade industry.
In the end, Iceland won a hard-fought sea dispute because it understood these
dynamics and played its structural hand magnificently well. Iceland exploited
asymmetries in the NATO alliance; trends in ocean law; its technocrats’ genius in
the field of ocean politics; crude but effective technology targeting its adversary’s
critical capabilities; its ability to initiate reciprocal costs in the form of withholding safe harbor, preventing safety of flight, and withdrawing temporary fishing
rights from rule breakers; and, most importantly, the nationalistic fervor of the
Icelandic people themselves and their visceral attachment to their home waters.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY SEA DISPUTES
What insights can the Anglo-Icelandic sea disputes, and the Second Cod War in
particular, lend to contemporary sea disputes, especially in a great-power context? There is no poverty of ongoing disputes to which they could be applied: the
dispute among China, Taiwan, and Japan over the Senkaku Islands in the East
China Sea; several disputes stemming from state seizures of commercial shipping
vessels; and a dispute on the docket for arbitration (as of the time of writing) at the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) over the maritime boundary
between Mauritius and the Maldives in the Indian Ocean. But only the aggregated
disputes in the South China Sea rival—and perhaps exceed—the Second Cod
War in legal and strategic complexity, asymmetry, and great-power and alliance
implications.
The various South China Sea disputes revolve around overlapping or excessive
claims to seas, zones, and a variety of exclusive access, jurisdictional, and resource
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rights. No fewer than seven disputants (China, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Philippines) contend for their claims in this maritime space
where $3.4 trillion of global trade passes by ship annually and the geopolitical stakes
are raised by China’s regional economic, political, and military predominance.104
Although some of the disputes involve multiple parties, most are binary affairs
between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and one of the other claimants in
question. Added to these dynamics, and elevating the SCS disputes to a competition on a much grander scale, is the interest of parties that are external to the
claims themselves, such as the United States, Japan, and major European powers.
These extraregional actors employ diplomatic and physical presence to ensure
that freedom of navigation is maintained; the tenets of international law, especially UNCLOS, are adhered to; and global commerce will continue unabated
while the disputes play out.
The value of comparing the Anglo-Icelandic and SCS disputes is resident
in the level of detail below the question of which states were or were not great
powers. Perhaps the greatest difference between the two sets of disputes lies with
which of the respective states asserted or are asserting maximal claims. In the
Cod Wars Iceland was a minor state enforcing claims against a major military and
economic power, while in the South China Sea it is China—which may be in the
process of displacing the United States in global military and economic predominance—that is seeking to assert claims against its much smaller regional neighbors. But evaluating the similarities and differences among the SCS stakeholders
reveals the following three key structural elements of the disputes that shape the
asymmetries among SCS disputants and inform the future of those disputes:
1. The existence of economic ties between China and the other claimants
2. The relative stability in the law of the sea regime brought by the 1982
UNCLOS, even while norms, rights, and territorial seas are being
determined among competing states
3. The arrangement of alliances in the Pacific
First, the economic ties between China and other claimants, such as the
Philippines, are strong in ways that transcend the sea disputes and the resources
tied to them. China is the Philippines’ foremost trading partner, with bilateral
trade reaching close to $50 billion in 2019, having grown at an average rate of 17
percent the previous five years.105 This was not the case in the Second Cod War,
during which Britain and Iceland’s trade ties were marginal.
On its face, Southeast Asia’s economic dependency on China is an asymmetry
that favors China strongly. The balance of power by almost any definition—economic, political, or military—favors China in the SCS disputes with its neighbors
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and produces hesitancy among those claimants. To contest China’s claims, they
must take a long view of minimizing economic damage from retaliatory or coercive Chinese tariffs or embargoes. This may be a crucial factor for external
competitors in the SCS disputes interested in maintaining the tenets of UNCLOS,
such as the United States—for disputants to be incentivized to compete at all,
they must be reassured that in the long run they can reestablish economic ties
with China. Perhaps the greatest countermeasure these smaller powers have
against this economic constraint, at least in the long run, is information. Information is an asymmetry over which competitors have direct control; information campaigns can be waged effectively by a lesser power against a greater
power, even one willing to toss around its economic weight. In the Cod Wars,
Iceland waged an information campaign in international legal and political
circles to emphasize resource scarcity, the threats to the fish stocks in Icelandic
waters, and the importance of those fish stocks to Iceland’s national diet and survival. Similarly, an information campaign by smaller powers in the SCS disputes
would need to promote a victimhood narrative emphasizing that they are trying
to protect their legal right to territorial seas, economic zones, and continental
shelf resources, and thereby to ensure resource security for their people. This
could be an effective foil to the economic asymmetry favoring China, as long
as it allows room for relations to mend in the future, following each dispute’s
resolution.
The second structural element at play in the SCS disputes is the comparative
stability in the evolution of the law of the sea that was brought about by ratification
of UNCLOS in 1982. With the exception of a recent push by several states to create
a new, binding instrument under UNCLOS to conserve marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction, the main tenets of UNCLOS that govern
territorial seas, the EEZ, the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf, resource
rights within those areas, freedom of transit, and innocent passage—most of
which were unresolved during the Anglo-Icelandic disputes—remain unchanged,
codified, and reinforced by several decades of global practice. What is more, the
UNCLOS mechanisms for settling disputes are obligatory for the ratifying parties
to the convention; these include the option to submit disputes to the ITLOS, the
ICJ at The Hague, or other international bodies such as the Permanent Court of
Arbitration (PCA). These mechanisms bolster the law of the sea regime’s stability
and have been largely successful at facilitating peaceful dispute resolutions over
the last four decades. This contrasts sharply with the legal environment during
the Second Cod War, when the law of the sea regime was evolving at a breakneck pace, driven in no small part by disputes such as the Cod Wars. Now that
UNCLOS exists, there is no window of opportunity for states to push for
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codification of revisionist legal interpretations and novel assertions of jurisdiction
with respect to key convention tenets such as the territorial sea and EEZ.
Therefore, now that the rules are more or less set, the balance of legitimacy is
an asymmetry that works against China’s efforts to legitimate its claims to “sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and
subsoil thereof ” within its infamous “nine-dash line” around the South China
Sea.106 The asymmetric advantage that the balance of legitimacy provides is a
moral and legal one, because China is a ratifying party to the convention. It also
provides opposing claimants the leverage to threaten China—while accepting
some level of political and economic risk in the process—with arbitral proceedings, as the Philippines successfully managed, earning favorable rulings from the
PCA against China’s claims to and activity within disputed waters in July 2016.107
Third, the SCS disputes lack the intra-alliance dynamics that constrained Britain in the Cod Wars. Iceland was able to use the critical NATO capabilities that
it hosted as a diplomatic chip; the NATO alliance constituted a means Iceland
could use to compete. Conversely, in the Pacific, alliances such as the U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with the Philippines act more as a hedge against the
SCS disputes escalating too far than as leverage for a claimant to raise the costs
of competition for other contenders. Even if the Philippines used the MDT as a
backstop against open conflict to employ more-aggressive tactics against PRC
incursions into its claimed areas, it still would serve as a threat against escalating into open conflict. Defense treaties and regional associations with broader
mandates serve to contain sea disputes within the realm of competition through
collective action, but the point here is that the competition proceeds regardless
of those alliances.
There is, however, collective action beyond the standing alliances in the Pacific that could be a significant asymmetric advantage and enable contenders to
compete more effectively: multinational naval task forces empowered to enforce
claims. For China, this would require finding and enlisting like-minded states
that agreed with the claims associated with the nine-dash line and perhaps also
favored a revisionist approach to UNCLOS, whether based on historical claims or
a realpolitik, might-makes-right perspective. Although this would accrue some
legitimacy to China’s efforts, the likelihood that it could assemble any such set of
partners is slim. The most support China has enjoyed in its SCS disputes came in
April 2016, when it announced that it had reached a four-point consensus with
Brunei, Laos, and Cambodia that the SCS disputes should not be an issue for the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations but rather should be addressed in direct
bilateral dialogues and negotiations.108 But these are not powerful countries with
capabilities to provide maritime presence to observe and monitor compliance, let
alone compete effectively outside their own home waters.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss2/9
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In contrast, a multinational task force with a mandate to provide presence
and observe, and possibly enforce, law of the sea rulings against China’s claims
and activities in the SCS disputes is likely to be more achievable. There have
been many calls from interested extraregional states to form such a task force
using models from the European Union (EU), NATO, or the United Nations.109
In recent months, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom have sent their
naval forces on patrols through the SCS. France, Germany, the Netherlands, and
the EU all have issued Indo-Pacific strategy documents in recent years, while
the United Kingdom’s 2021 security review describes the country’s “tilt to the
Indo-Pacific.”110 If interested extraregional parties formed a maritime task force
to support ITLOS or PCA law of the sea rulings, it could provide an asymmetric
advantage to smaller claimants (with their invitation) competing against China’s
expansive claims. More importantly, a maritime task force of external parties may
be the only way to coerce China successfully into recognizing ITLOS or PCA rulings against it, even tacitly. In the absence of formidable competition to support
those rulings, there is great potential for China simply to disregard unfavorable
ones, much as Iceland rejected the ICJ’s interim ruling against it in 1972.
These three dynamics—economic ties to China, relative stability in the law
of the sea regime, and arrangement of alliances—provide the SCS disputes their
asymmetric structure. However, asymmetries themselves do not determine dispute outcomes, as they did not in the Second Cod War. Whatever asymmetries
exist need to be not only established but acted on and exploited, because what
matters—what really moves the needle in competition—is the activities that each
disputant adopts and carries out to raise the cost to its adversaries of continuing
the competition. Such activities must be conducted with vigor, cleverness, and
conviction, and, in the case of the SCS, with the support of like-minded states.
HOW TO WIN COD WARS: LESSONS ON COMPETITION
What lessons do the Cod Wars provide for direct contenders and extraregional
interested parties in today’s sea disputes with great powers? Lesson number one
is that to win, states must compete using lawfare, tradefare, and alliancefare,
concurrent with naval posture-and-presence activities. Contenders cannot win
simply by not losing.
The Cod Wars also demonstrate that activities that adhere strictly to the bounds
of UNCLOS—such as freedom-of-navigation (FON) operations (FONOPs) that
exercise the transit rights already inherent in UNCLOS—are insufficient to prevail in sea disputes. Although FONOPs and their accompanying assertions do
dissuade extreme claims, such as any modern equivalent of ancient Rome’s mare
nostrum (our sea) claim of sole control over the Mediterranean Sea, they do not
impact the SCS competitors’ activities in the disputed waters directly, nor do they
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raise the cost of competition.111 For example, during the First Cod War the Royal
Navy conducted presence patrols within twelve nautical miles of Iceland’s coast,
but Britain learned quickly that mere presence was insufficient to dissuade the
Icelanders from fishing wherever they wanted, nor did it inhibit Icelandic coast
guard operations against British trawlers.
When thinking about the nature of China’s claims in the SCS, comparatively
innocuous activities such as FONOPs likely have little meaningful long-term
impact on China’s competitive activities in disputed waters, regardless of its immediate reactions to FON transits. When China submitted its notes verbales of
2009 and 2011 to the United Nations with respect to its nine-dash-line claim and
claims over the waters around the Spratly Islands, it specified those claims in
terms of UNCLOS and did not claim sovereignty over the whole maritime area
within the nine-dash line, as is popularly described in the media. China’s 2009
note, responding to a joint submission to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf by Vietnam and Malaysia, asserted that it “enjoys sovereign
rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil
thereof (see attached map [that is, the nine-dash line]).”112 Similarly, and notwithstanding the weakness of its sovereignty claim over Philippine land features,
subsequently denied in the PCA’s 2016 ruling, China claimed in its 2011 note that
“China’s Nansha [Spratly] Islands [are] fully entitled to Territorial Sea, Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf.”113 Mere naval transits and presence outside twelve miles from claimed land features such as the Spratly Islands,
while they may normalize maritime interactions and military activities in the
SCS and may dissuade the Chinese from escalating their claims, neither pose any
legal threats to nor impose any costs on China. In fact, when transits intentionally
respect those twelve-mile maritime boundaries they even may provide implicit
recognition of China’s claims to those features.
What, then, does effective competition look like? What tactics can smaller or
extraregional powers use against great powers such as China? The Second Cod
War suggests four principal competitive strategies, listed here, that may be used
in any combination. They are explored below in the context of the SCS disputes.
1. Establish mechanisms of competitive reciprocity.
2. Develop technologies that target a competing claimant’s ability to compete.
3. Enable partners with arbitral mandates to posture in disputed areas.
4. Establish a neutral maritime task force to provide physical protection and
monitor rule-following behaviors.
Game theory informs us that establishing reciprocity in a strategic relationship with iterative interactions forces cooperation; otherwise both parties in the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss2/9
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relationship stand to lose.114 In sea disputes, if both parties have positions from
which they can impose precise and proportional reciprocal costs on each other,
competitive advantages shaped by asymmetries are nullified, unless or until one
side can establish a new relative advantage. This allows, even demands, new
competitive means to replace the earlier ones, or to better compel the parties
toward peaceful resolution. Toward the end of the Second Cod War, Iceland
imposed reciprocal costs on rule-breaking British tugs, trawlers, and maritime
patrol aircraft as well as Royal Navy frigates by withholding safe harbor for platforms experiencing emergencies and by preventing flight safety by not providing
air traffic control guidance to military aircraft involved in the dispute. Iceland’s
coup de grâce was blacklisting trawlers that broke the terms given to them for
temporary fishing rights in specified zones. The key part of this cost imposition
was that when certain trawlers were blacklisted, Iceland did not allow Britain to
replace them on the agreed-upon annual quota list of authorized vessels. It was
a tit for tat, but with a hook that the reciprocal action would result in a new and
permanent cost imposition on the rule breaker.
To establish similar mechanisms of competitive reciprocity in the SCS disputes, the weaker contenders first must establish positions from which to carry
out the reciprocal actions. These could be remote fisheries or zones of seabed
and subsoil exploration that overlap areas claimed by China and are frequented
by the Chinese coast guard, Chinese long-distance fishing trawlers, and Chinese
seabed and subsoil exploration platforms and companies. The second condition
for competitive reciprocity is a legal mandate, such as the Philippines’ favorable
ruling from the PCA in 2016. Such rulings provide weaker claimants with a
moral and legal position that possesses international legitimacy and puts leverage behind their enforcement efforts. The third element is to set the terms of
these zones (potentially with some access rights for China), then allow the other
claimants to enforce them as well, and to impose access costs against all Chinese
violations, as Iceland did to Britain with its trawler blacklist in the Second Cod
War. Over time, if rule breaking continues and is documented, the claimants politely could expunge the Chinese from temporary access agreements, employing
a strategy similar to Iceland’s.
The second set of activities to impose costs in sea disputes while keeping
the dispute below thresholds for open conflict is to develop technologies that
directly target an opponent’s ability to exploit resources or gain access within
the disputed areas, in much the same way that Iceland used warp cutters against
British fishing gear. It is critical that these activities have a high probability of
remaining nonlethal in execution; otherwise they risk unproductive escalation.
In the SCS, net cutting is certainly one way to impose costs on China’s fishing
industry and could be carried out in a reciprocal and proportional way, as noted
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previously. Other critical Chinese capabilities that could be targeted are seabed
and oil exploration platforms. Technologies such as unmanned underwater
vehicles (UUVs) capable of cutting electrical and control cables to Chinese
undersea-exploration equipment operating in the claimant’s zone improperly
may be the most effective tactic for imposing costs on China in the SCS moving forward. Another option may be to use UUVs and similar technologies to
disable Chinese dredges illegally building up artificial islands from which to
posture military and industrial capabilities, such as those China constructed in
the Spratly Islands.115 Also, interposed with a campaign of high-tech interference
intended to frustrate and impose cost, technologies and tactics would need to
be developed to provide air, surface, and subsurface protective measures for the
weaker claimants to preserve their competitive advantage and protect their own
critical maritime economic activity from Chinese retaliation. (This is also an
area in which security guarantees from a stronger, extraregional partner such as
the United States might be explored.)
The third category of competitive activity is enabling claimants to posture
their regulatory, trade, and military capabilities in and around the disputed areas.
For interested extraregional parties, helping claimants organize and normalize a
vibrant ecosystem of this state power in the disputed waters is crucial for the successful realization of the claims. Much like Iceland in the Second Cod War, China
has consolidated and expanded its maritime institutions by combining its marine
surveillance, fisheries law enforcement, and maritime customs bureaucracies
under a new coast guard and placed it under the Central Military Commission.116
The China Coast Guard now can perform maritime enforcement and exploitation activities at a great distance and take advantage of augmentation from the
People’s Liberation Army Navy. For the weaker contenders in the SCS disputes
to compete against the weight of China’s capabilities, they too must organize and
deploy their maritime assets regularly and enforce their claims using nonlethal
means as necessary. To be even more effective, a weaker claimant could build up
its own land features in the disputed waters in much the same fashion as China
has, then use them similarly to strengthen regulatory authority over the claimant’s EEZ while improving maritime surveillance and enforcement. Claimants
also could create fish conservation zones or exploitation zones around these
sites and offer temporary or more permanent access to these zones to morecooperative and -compliant neighbors. Assisting contenders to establish, nurture,
and resource trade associations such as fishing federations also would help the
ecosystem to flourish and enable the claimants to compete at sea. These investments and efforts, bolstered by extraregional investment and assistance, could
go a long way toward ensuring the permanent effect of a legal ruling on behalf of
claimants opposing China’s creeping maximalism.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss2/9

40

THOMPSON

Thompson: The Second Anglo-Icelandic Cod War (1972–73)—Analysis of a Modern

163

Lastly, defense alliances do not contribute directly to competition but do
deter sea disputes from escalating to open conflict. However, establishment of a
maritime task force by states that share common interests in the UNCLOS regime
and are willing to provide physical protection and to monitor or enforce compliance with arbitral rulings may be an effective path. This method may be a way
to ensure that international law is normalized over time and ensure that claimants such as China that are on the wrong side of UNCLOS come to recognize its
terms over time. Such a maritime task force may be more successful if it does not
threaten directly China’s interests outside the dispute in question, so it might be
better if its members are neutral external states, rather than countries such as
the United States, which, even though it claims to take no side in the sovereignty
disputes, nonetheless remains a Pacific power itself.
These four strategies should be mutually reinforcing and relentlessly coordinated, in much the same fashion that Iceland coordinated its campaigns in the
Anglo-Icelandic sea disputes; any one of the four alone is insufficient to succeed
against the structure and asymmetries of the SCS disputes. It also bears repeating
that these activities are not viable competitive means if they lack the legitimacy
provided by some internationally recognized mandate aligned with UNCLOS.
Similarly, effective, legitimate participation and assistance from extraregional
powers is predicated on a clear invitation and request from a claimant.
As the brief treatment above implies, even closer comparative analyses of the
Anglo-Icelandic disputes and the sea disputes in East and Southeast Asia are warranted. The stakes are high, and one hopes that the competitive lessons from the
Second Cod War will inform claimants and other interested parties and incline
them toward more-peaceful and -effective paths to dispute resolution.
The Philippines case was chosen as illustrative because much of that country’s
dispute with China has been resolved—in the view of the UNCLOS regime—by
the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 2016 ruling. To the extent that China ever
had historic rights to resources in the waters under consideration, they were
extinguished because they were incompatible with the EEZs provided for in the
convention, which China ratified. The PCA also concluded that there was no
legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas
falling within the nine-dash line; that none of the features China was claiming
was capable of generating an EEZ; and that China had violated the Philippines’
sovereign rights in its EEZ by interfering with Philippine fishing and petroleum
exploration, constructing artificial islands, and failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the zone.117
The basis for effective competition against China in the SCS disputes begins
with an invitation from one of the rival claimants and the resulting mandate.
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The Philippines is primed to meet those criteria if the country’s next government
(after the May 2022 general election) is more aggressive against the PRC’s SCS
claims than President Rodrigo Duterte was in office. Although the country’s
enforcement of the 2016 ruling has been anemic to date, the Philippines could
request support for its claims from the United States, European states, or NATO.
These actors ought to be ready to assist the Philippines and others in their competition against excessive Chinese claims in East and Southeast Asia.
The Anglo-Icelandic disputes are an imperfect analogy to the South China Sea
disputes, owing to the distinct structural differences between the disputes and
the asymmetries created by their respective structures. Nonetheless, the AngloIcelandic sea disputes provide lessons that should be carried forward to inform
great and small powers alike about how to compete for limited objectives and win
without fighting an open war.
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